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1. INTRODUCTION
The most recent speech from the throne contained a pledge from the federal government to "work with
provinces to implement a national system for the governance of research involving humans, including
national research ethics and standards."(FN1) This commitment signals a desire on the part of the federal
government to address concerns about the inadequacies of the current governance of health research
involving humans [RIH]. To this end, Health Canada's Ethics Division is currently exploring the ways in which
such a national governance system for RIH might be implemented.(FN2) It is important for the federal
government, as it moves toward making good on its Throne Speech pledge, to have clarity concerning the
jurisdictional authority to legislate with regard to RIH. Specifically, it needs to be clear about whether the
constitutional jurisdiction over RIH rests with the federal government, the provinces or whether it is divided
or shared between them. The answer to this jurisdictional question will shape the federal government's
approach to any negotiations with the provinces concerning the creation and implementation of a national
system of governance for RIH. Addressing the jurisdictional issues is an important precursor to any
negotiation process for two reasons. First, the scope of federal and provincial power over RIH is key both to
the design and implementation of a comprehensive national system of regulation over RIH. It is necessary to
determine which sphere of government has the power to do what before deciding how to go about creating a
national governance system. Second, knowing the extent and the scope of federal jurisdiction with respect
to RIH might strengthen the negotiating position of the federal government vis a vis the provinces. It will
provide clarity as to what the federal government could do in terms of regulating RIH if the provinces are
unwilling to cooperate. In short, it will make clear whether, and to what extent, the federal government needs
provincial agreement to regulate RIH and what options are available to the federal government if such
agreement is not attained.
This article takes up this preliminary issue of jurisdiction with respect to legislation concerning the
regulation of RIH. In particular, it assesses the extent and scope of federal jurisdiction over RIH and
considers its options from a jurisdictional point of view in securing a national system of governance of RIH.
Thus, this article does not address the wisdom of a national system of regulation with respect to RIH.(FN3)
We do not here offer an answer to the question "should the federal government regulate RIH?" or "should
there be a national system of regulation?" Rather, we are here concerned with the question of whether or not
the federal government can legislate in this area or, perhaps more specifically, "how can the federal
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government fulfill its pledge to create and implement a national system of governance for RIH?" This article
is thus intended to clarify the jurisdictional context(FN4) in which negotiations over the governance of RIH
will take place.
2. OVERVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL DIVISION OF POWERS ANALYSIS
Before considering the specific constitutional jurisdiction over RIH, a brief overview of the analytical
framework for assessing constitutional validity on jurisdictional grounds is necessary. The Constitution Act,
1867(FN5) sets the basic ground rules in ascribing powers to the federal and provincial orders of
government, with the courts acting as constitutional umpires. In doing so, courts proceed by way of a
two-step process. First, the court must determine the subject matter of the impugned legislation. Courts then
embark on an interpretation of the power-distributing provisions of the Constitution in order to determine
whether the subject matter of the challenged law falls within the powers assigned to the enacting body. We
will deal with each step in turn.
Cast in constitutional language, the first step involves courts asking "what is the legislation in relation to,
or what is its pith and substance?"(FN6) The aim, at this stage of the analysis, is to identify the dominant or
most important characteristic of the law.(FN7) It is important to note that this determination does not mean
that a law cannot have other effects. It is permissible for legislation to have a central purpose related to a
matter within the jurisdiction of one level of government and nonetheless have significant effects on a
subject matter outside that level of government's jurisdiction.(FN8) So long as these effects are incidental to
the purpose of the legislation they will not be determinative of jurisdiction. As the Supreme Court recently
explained in the Reference Re Firearms Act:
The determination of which head of power a particular law falls under is not an exact science. In a federal
system, each level of government can expect to have its jurisdiction affected by the other to a certain
degree. As Dickson C.J. stated in General Motors of Canada Ltd. v. City National Leasing, [1989] 1 S.C.R.
641, at p. 669, 'overlap of legislation is to be expected and accommodated in a federal state'. Laws mainly in
relation to the jurisdiction of one level of government may overflow into, or have 'incidental effects' upon, the
jurisdiction of the other level of government. It is a matter of balance and of federalism: no one level of
government is isolated from the other, nor can it usurp the functions of the other.(FN9)
Courts will look at both the purpose and effect of the law in characterizing the subject matter of a law. To
this end, it is helpful if the legislature makes the purpose of the law clear on the face of the statute, although
courts are not bound to accept what is said at face value if there are grounds for assuming an ulterior
motive. Courts will then look beyond the form of the law or its stated purpose to consider the substance of
the law. The doctrine of colourability can be invoked in cases where a court finds that while the stated
purpose or form of the law is within the jurisdiction of the enacting body, the actual substance of the law falls
outside this jurisdiction.(FN10)
The second step in the courts' discernment process, as to whether a law is intra or ultra vires, is the
interpretation of the power-distributing provisions of the Constitution to determine whether the subject matter
of the challenged law falls within the powers assigned to the enacting body.(FN11) Generally, the answer to
the characterization question in the first step is made mindful of this next step in that the language used to
characterize the impugned law is often drawn from that used in the division of powers sections of the
Constitution. The characterization of the challenged law is thus often determinative of the subsequent
question as to where power over such a matter resides.(FN12)
The opening words of ss. 91 and 92 of the Constitution grant to each sphere of government exclusive
power over the subject matters listed therein.(FN13) The division of powers in the Constitution is intended to
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be exhaustive. This means that there is no subject matter that is not within the jurisdiction of either the
provinces or the federal government. Further, in most cases, each level of government enjoys exclusive
jurisdiction over the subject matters assigned to it. However, determining jurisdiction is not as simple as this
explanation might suggest. It is complicated by the fact that some issues are not considered subject matters
in and of themselves that can be assigned wholly to one level of the government or the other. As will be
discussed in the next section of this paper, "health" is one such topic.
Jurisdictional determinations are also made more complex because a law can have more than one
aspect, and thus each aspect might fall under different heads of jurisdiction. Thus it is possible to
characterize two similar laws as concerned with two different subject matters, one within provincial
jurisdiction and the other within federal. This is referred to as the double aspect doctrine.(FN14) As the
Supreme Court of Canada explains, this doctrine allows that:
...two relatively similar rules or sets of rules may validly be found, one in legislation within exclusive federal
jurisdiction, and the other in legislation within exclusive provincial jurisdiction because they are enacted for
different purposes and in different legislative contexts which give them distinct constitutional
characterizations.(FN15)
The Court does note, however, that the double aspect doctrine is not to be used without caution, thus
suggesting that it is not intended as a means of avoiding jurisdictional decisions.(FN16) Rather, it ought to
be used only in cases where the provincial and federal aspects of a law are equal in importance.(FN17)
There are then four options with respect to jurisdiction over an issue:
* jurisdiction may rest exclusively with the provinces;
* jurisdiction may lie wholly with the federal government;
* jurisdiction may be divided between the federal and provincial government along their jurisdictional lines,
each with control over certain aspects of the issue; or
* jurisdiction may be overlapping (concurrent) between the two levels of government, each with control
over the whole of the matter barring a conflict.
The third and fourth options require some further clarification. Jurisdiction can be "shared" -- meaning that
both the federal and provincial governments have jurisdiction in relation to a particular topic in two senses.
First, as in option three above, jurisdiction can be divided between the federal government and the
provinces. Under this option neither level of government has exclusive jurisdiction over the whole of the
matter (i.e., over RIH as a whole) rather, each will have authority over the topic in so far as it is otherwise
within its jurisdiction. Divided jurisdiction arises when an issue has not been assigned as a subject matter
within the exclusive jurisdiction of one level of government or the other. Where this is the case, jurisdiction
over these matters is divided along existing jurisdictional lines. For example, with respect to research
involving humans, jurisdiction might depend on which level of government has jurisdiction over the sphere in
which such research takes place.
The second sense in which jurisdiction can also be thought of as shared is represented by option four of
the options listed above. This involves situations where an issue has more than one aspect or can be
characterized as falling under more than one matter (i.e., one coming within federal jurisdiction and one
within the purview of the provinces); such situations are contemplated by the double aspect doctrine. Thus,
the federal government and the provinces can assert jurisdiction concurrently over the issue and legislate in
respect of it provided such legislation does not conflict. As we will discuss further below, when option four is
considered in more detail, in the case of a conflict, the doctrine of paramountcy dictates that the federal law
will trump the provincial.

The remainder of this paper will consider each of these options with respect to the subject of research
involving humans.
3. PROVINCIAL AUTHORITY TO REGULATE RIH
"Health" is not mentioned in the lists of subject matters assigned under the Constitution exclusively to
either the Parliament or the provinces.(FN18) One might be tempted to think this was simply an oversight by
the drafters or a result of the fact that, outside of emergency circumstances, health and healthcare were not
traditional responsibilities of government. However, the courts have established that "health" is not a single
subject matter amenable to exclusive assignment to one level of government or the other. Rather "health" is
a complex, multifaceted and "amorphous" topic, jurisdiction over which is divided according to its connection
with established heads of jurisdiction.(FN19) Determining jurisdiction over health as a whole, then, is not
possible. Instead, one must inquire into the purpose and effect of the health related law in order to ascertain
where it fits within the jurisdiction granted to the different orders of government by the Constitution.
Although "health" is not a subject matter assigned by the division of powers, it is generally agreed that the
Constitution affords the provinces broad legislative jurisdiction in health-related matters.(FN20) In Schneider,
Dickson J. (as he then was) cited the findings of the 1940 Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial
Relations (the Rowell-Sirois Commission), in which the Commission concluded that:
Provincial responsibilities in health matters should be considered basic and residual. Dominion activities on
the other hand should be considered exceptions to the general rule of provincial responsibility, and should
be justified in each case on the merit of their performance by the Dominion rather than the province.(FN21)
As Dickson J. added:
This view that the general jurisdiction over health matters is provincial (allowing for a limited federal
jurisdiction either ancillary to the express heads of power in s. 91 or the emergency power under peace,
order and good government) has prevailed and is now not seriously questioned.(FN22)
Initially, the provinces' general power over health matters was grounded in s. 92(16) which grants
provincial jurisdiction over matters of "a merely local or private nature". However, as Martha Jackman notes,
s. 92(13) (property and civil rights) "has largely supplanted section 92(16) as a residual category of
provincial authority"(FN23) and, according to Jackman:
Section 92(13) also has been interpreted as providing the provinces with general jurisdiction over publichealth matters. In conjunction with the provincial licencing power under section 92(9), this jurisdiction
includes the power to regulate the medical profession, medical practices, and health services, as well as the
power over health insurance. With section 93, which grants the provinces exclusive power to legislate in
relation to education, section 92(13) also supports provincial regulation of medical and health education and
training.(FN24)
Provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights has been broadly interpreted to include the power to
regulate the civil rights of individuals resident within their borders.(FN25) Specifically, it is within the power of
the provinces to affect rights between individuals generated by tort, contract, and property law. This means
that legislation addressing or regulating research involving humans through tort, contract, or property law
would come within the jurisdiction of the provinces. For example, restrictions might be placed on the right to
contract in cases related to research involving human subjects. Also, any legislative scheme that sought to
regulate RIH solely through the creation or alteration of civil causes of action or remedies would have to
emanate from the provincial legislatures. As Bernard Dickens notes with reference to the regulation of
research involving children:
Protection [of researchers] from civil liability, for instance for battery in invasive research, breach of fiduciary

duty in management of medical records or conversion of available bodily tissues, would depend on
provincial legislation.(FN26)
Jackman offers further insight into the potential for provincial jurisdiction over health matters in the context
of her discussion of new reproductive technologies (NRTs). She argues that:
Provincial jurisdiction over public health under the property and civil rights clause, combined with the
provincial jurisdiction over hospitals [under s. 92(7)], gives the provinces the prima facie authority with
respect to NRTs as a health matter. Levels of new reproductive health and hospital services; health
requirements relating to the research, development, and application of NRTs in hospital and non-medical
settings; standards of medical ethics and practice; local public health information; and the insurability of
NRTs under provincial health insurance plans would be matters of valid provincial concern.(FN27)
Extrapolating from Jackman's comments, it is possible to argue that research involving humans, insofar
as it represents a public health matter, could fall into the residual provincial health power. It also seems likely
that such research would fall under provincial authority when it is conducted by medical professionals in a
hospital or university setting since both hospitals and universities are within the jurisdiction of the provinces,
under ss. 92(7) and 93 respectively. Further, regulation of professions, including the establishment of rules of
conduct, is widely recognized as coming within the provincial sphere of jurisdiction under s. 92(13).(FN28)
Thus, it would appear that in the absence of exclusive federal jurisdiction over the matter, provincial
governments possess some constitutional authority to regulate the practice of health-related RIH that occurs
within their borders.
It is important, however, to recognize the significance of the opening words of s.92 "[i]n each province" as
a limitation on the scope of provincial jurisdiction.(FN29) The listed powers are granted to the provinces to
exercise within their territory. This limit is intended not only to protect against provincial intrusion into the
federal sphere of authority, but also to ensure that one province cannot trench on the powers of another
province. Thus, provincial jurisdiction is territorially limited, that is, legislation will exceed provincial
jurisdiction if it contemplates extra-territorial application.(FN30) This limitation will not, however, be applied
strictly, as the jurisprudence allows that laws can have extra-territorial effects so long as they are merely
incidental to the valid provincial purpose of the law.(FN31)
This limitation on provincial jurisdiction may nevertheless affect provincial attempts to legislate in the area
of RIH. At the very least, it would seem to require caution on the part of a province in structuring regulations
so as to cover only those activities within its territory. This may pose significant difficulties in the context of
RIH given the extent to which research projects are integrated and carried out simultaneously in locations in
different provinces. It is generally necessary for research protocols to be consistent in all locations and thus
the regulations of one province are bound to have effects on the conduct of researchers engaged in the
same project in other provinces. Further, even in cases where the research is located within the boundaries
of a single province, the results and effects of the research are not. The products of such research will reach
those beyond the territory of the province. Whether or not such effects will be viewed as merely incidental
will require a case-by-case analysis of the purposes of the provincial legislation at issue.(FN32) It is clear,
however, that designing provincial laws that do not trench on the jurisdiction of other provinces in the area of
RIH represents an important challenge to those asserting provincial jurisdiction.
One can conclude from this overview that provincial jurisdiction over RIH is likely to be partial at best.
There seems to be no obvious basis for asserting exclusive provincial jurisdiction over RIH. Rather, the
authority to regulate such research would have to be predicated on existing provincial powers over specific
areas, for example hospitals and education. Provincial jurisdiction over health is broad but not exclusive. It is

clear that the provinces have a general power with respect to public health but courts have indicated
exceptions to this residual provincial power within which Parliament can legislate with respect to health.
Furthermore, the territorial limits placed on provincial jurisdiction may pose significant difficulties in the
design of provincial governance of RIH. Given that the provinces do not appear to have a clear case for
exclusive jurisdiction over RIH, it is necessary to consider the scope of federal jurisdiction over the matter to
determine whether a claim for exclusive federal authority could be sustained or whether jurisdiction over this
matter is divided or overlapping.
4. FEDERAL AUTHORITY TO REGULATE RIH
As discussed in the previous section, the provinces may be able to legislate with respect to RIH in some
areas as part and parcel of their jurisdiction under s. 92(13). However, it does not necessarily follow that the
federal government is precluded from finding constitutional authority for its own legislative initiatives in this
area. While the Schneider case was cited above for the proposition that health-related matters generally fall
into the provincial sphere of authority, it should be noted that Dickson J.'s discussion in that case explicitly
left room for Parliament to establish "a limited federal jurisdiction either ancillary to the express powers of s.
91 or the emergency power under peace, order and good government."(FN33) Significantly, Laskin C.J. and
Estey J. wrote separate but concurring decisions in the same case underlining their concern that the ruling
not preclude Parliament's ability to legislate with respect to matters of national public health. In the words of
Laskin C.J., "[t]his conclusion must not be taken as excluding the Parliament of Canada from legislating in
relation to public health, viewed as directed to the protection of the national welfare."(FN34) Estey J. offered
a similar caution in his decision affirming that:
... 'health' is not a matter which is subject to specific constitutional assignment but instead is an amorphous
topic which can be addressed by valid federal or provincial legislation, depending in the circumstances of
each case on the nature or scope of the health problem in question.(FN35)
Federal jurisdiction and the scope of such jurisdiction depends upon the extent to which it is possible to
ground authority under one of the constitutional heads of power granted to Parliament. This section will
explore several heads of power under which federal jurisdiction to regulate RIH might be supported. It will
consider whether there is a basis for exclusive federal jurisdiction and, if not, the extent of federal jurisdiction
over this area. The most promising bases upon which to ground federal legislation include the criminal law,
trade and commerce, and peace, order and good government (POGG) powers. The POGG basis for
jurisdiction will be examined after the other two because it is a residual power of the federal government.
This means, as will be examined in more detail later in this section, that POGG can only be invoked if a
subject matter does not fall within the enumerated grounds under the division of powers in the Constitution.
A) CRIMINAL LAW
Section 91(27) of the Constitution Act 1867 grants Parliament exclusive jurisdiction over criminal law. As a
general rule, criminal law must meet three essential prerequisites: 1) a valid criminal law purpose, 2) backed
by a prohibition, and 3) a penalty.(FN36) Courts have included within the ambit of valid criminal law
purposes: public peace, order, security, health, morality and protection of the environment.(FN37)
This power thus gives the federal Parliament significant latitude to prohibit a wide range of RIH on the
grounds that such practices are injurious to public health, safety, and/or morality. In much the same way as
the courts have found that only Parliament has the jurisdiction to criminalize (or conversely, decriminalize)
abortion,(FN38) similar authority would exist it seems for the criminalization of such controversial practices
as cloning, the creation of human/animal hybrids, use of fetal tissue and stem cells, etc. Given this clear
federal jurisdiction, it is not surprising that many commentators suggest that the criminal law power provides

the strongest constitutional justification for regulation of new reproductive technologies [NRTs] (and
potentially by extension RIH).(FN39) It seems likely then that the criminal law power could be used as a
basis for a limited federal jurisdiction over RIH -- i.e. the power to prohibit outright certain RIH practices. The
more interesting question is, however, whether this power can sustain a broader jurisdictional claim -- the
right to regulate those RIH practices that are not absolutely prohibited.
The case law is less clear when more complex regulatory modes of intervention are utilized. As Hogg
explains:
A criminal law ordinarily consists of a prohibition which is to be self-applied by the persons to whom it is
addressed. There is not normally any intervention by an administrative agency or official prior to the
application of the law. The law is 'administered' by law enforcement officials and courts of criminal
jurisdiction only in the sense that they can bring to bear the machinery of punishment after the prohibited
conduct has occurred. Lord Atkin's definition of criminal law [from the case of Proprietary Articles Trade
Association v. Attorney-General of Canada(FN40)] as prohibition coupled with a penalty suggested that
these formal characteristics were essential to any law which could be classified as criminal.(FN41)
Consequently, federal legislation that created administrative agencies to regulate business competition
and insurance practices under the rubric of the criminal law power has been struck down in some cases as
ultra vires Parliament.(FN42) Furthermore, in Nova Scotia Board of Censors v. McNeil(FN43), the
censorship of films via a provincial censorship board was held to be a valid exercise of provincial jurisdiction
as regulation of property and civil rights, and was not deemed an infringement of the federal criminal law
power.
This early case law seemed to seriously limit legislation involving regulatory schemes from the scope of
the criminal law power. However, more recent cases seem to point to a wider scope for the federal criminal
law power that would include some forms of administration that are regulatory in nature.(FN44) In HydroQuebec, the Court upheld a regulatory scheme as constitutional under the criminal law power in which an
administrative agency determined which substances were toxic and created regulations as to how such
substances were to be manufactured, stored, etc.(FN45) This scheme also allowed for exemptions for
provinces with similar or equivalent regulations. The key factor for the majority was that the administrative
procedure culminated in a prohibition enforced by penalty. The Hydro-Quebec reasoning was applied in the
Firearms Reference in which the federal government's national gun registry scheme was upheld as a valid
criminal law since the legislation ultimately provided a prohibition of unregistered guns coupled with penal
sanctions in pursuance of a valid criminal law purpose, namely, public safety.(FN46) These cases suggest
that the mere fact of regulation as part of a legislative scheme is not determinative as to whether it is a
legitimate use of the criminal law power. Rather, it is the ultimate aim of legislation and the regulatory
scheme that ought to be significant in coming to a determination as to jurisdiction under the criminal law
power.
In the Firearms Reference, the Supreme Court provided some clear guidance on the distinction between
regulation and criminal prohibition -- specifically, it addressed the question of whether regulatory schemes
are within federal jurisdiction under the criminal law power. The Court set out the following guidelines that
are relevant to the question of federal jurisdiction over RIH.
1. The mere fact that a legislative scheme is complex does not take away from its criminal nature. On this
point the Court pointed to the Food and Drugs Act and the Canadian Environmental Protection Act which
have both been upheld as coming within the federal criminal law power.(FN47)
2. The fact that an administrative officer is granted discretion is consistent with an exercise of the criminal

law power so long as the discretion is not undue. The Court held that while it would be undue for an
administrative body to be granted the power to define offences, this does not preclude the grant of discretion
altogether.(FN48)
3. The nature of the prohibitions and penalties themselves is significant. They must not be regulatory in
nature -- that is, they must not exist for the sole purpose of ensuring compliance with the regulatory scheme.
Such prohibitions and penalties also must not be directed at revenue generation or the regulation of
property. In order to come within the criminal law power such prohibitions and penalties must stand on their
own and be directed at a valid criminal law purpose.(FN49)
4. The criminal law does not require outright prohibition of an activity or item. Parliament is able to use
indirect means to achieve its desired ends as decided by the Supreme Court in RJR-MacDonald.(FN50) In
that case, a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada held that Parliament's purpose was to prevent the
negative health effects of a certain practice (in that case, the use of tobacco) and the fact that it sought to
achieve this purpose through indirect means (i.e. means other than an outright ban) did not remove the law
from the valid ambit of the federal criminal law power. Thus, controls placed on the advertising and
packaging of cigarettes were a valid exercise of the criminal law power and did not infringe provincial
jurisdiction over property and civil rights under s. 92(13).
5. Exemptions from a prohibition do not preclude a finding that a law is criminal in nature.(FN51)
The broad scope of the criminal law power as cast in the recent Supreme Court jurisprudence might give
pause to commentators like Jackman, Young and Wasunna who maintain that a regulatory approach to
federal legislative initiatives in the area of NRTs is likely to result in a successful constitutional challenge
based on the division of powers. Jackman, for example, writing in 1993 suggested that "while the federal
government cannot rely on the criminal law power to support complex regulatory intervention in relation to
NRTs, the criminal law power will support an array of prohibitions and sanctions in the area."(FN52)
Similarly Young and Wasunna suggest that proposed forms of NRT legislation can be seen as falling
along a continuum between "simple" prohibitions coupled with penalties at one end and "complex" regulatory
schemes at the other. Thus, "[a]s the scheme becomes more complex and elaborate, the likelihood that it
will be upheld under the criminal law power seems to diminish."(FN53) Furthermore, Young and Wasunna
apply the decision handed down in the Hydro-Quebec case to suggest that NRTs may not be amenable to
regulation under the criminal law power. First, they note that while in Hydro Quebec the federal
environmental legislation was upheld as constitutionally valid, the court was split 5-4 on the issue. Both
majority and dissent found that environmental protection was a valid public purpose under the criminal law
power. They diverged, however, on the emphasis given to the criminal law requirement of a prohibition with
penal consequences, and specifically on whether the provisions in question were primarily regulatory or
prohibitory in nature.(FN54)
According to Young and Wasunna, the majority seemed to avoid any analysis of this latter issue by
characterizing the question as being merely one of "colourability"; i.e. whether the act in question was
coloured to resemble criminal law when in fact it sought to regulate civil and property rights in the province.
Once it was established that Parliament had a genuine criminal law purpose behind its legislative scheme
(which both the majority and dissent agreed it had), the majority appeared willing to accept Parliament's
chosen means of achieving that purpose, even if it was largely regulatory in nature.(FN55) The dissent, on
the other hand, placed much more emphasis on the form of the legislative scheme; although they accepted
the fact that Parliament was pursuing a valid public purpose, to be constitutionally valid the legislation had
be of primarily prohibitory form rather than regulatory. To this end, the dissent considered whether the

regulatory portions of the scheme were ancillary to the prohibitions or vice versa. Finding that the
prohibitions contained in the impugned provisions were secondary to the regulatory aspects, the dissent
found the legislation ultra vires of the federal criminal law power.
Young and Wasunna suggest that changes to the composition of the Court subsequent to the decision in
Hydro-Quebec, as well as anticipated departures due to retirement,(FN56) point to the possibility that the
dissent's "clear emphasis on the distinction between regulation and prohibition might be employed in future
cases to strike down more flexible and elaborate regulatory schemes."(FN57) In addition, they note that
whereas in Hydro-Quebec the public purpose at the heart of the impugned legislation (i.e. the prevention of
environmental degradation) was found to be one of "superordinate importance" to Canadian society, it was
not clear that the subject of NRTs in general (and by analogy perhaps, RIH) represented a similarly
important threat to Canadian public health or morality.(FN58)
While it is impossible to predict the effect that future changes of the composition of the Court might have
on its jurisprudence, the predictions of Young and Wasunna do not appear to have been borne out in the
Firearms Reference, the most recent Supreme Court consideration of the criminal law power. The Court was
unanimous in its decision in that case, and clearly supported the majority view in Hydro-Quebec
emphasizing the purpose of regulations and their connection to prohibitions and penalties over the strict
"form over function" approach. The jurisprudence also makes clear that the existence of exceptions to
prohibitions that admit room for the activities in question to be regulated will not be fatal to a claim of criminal
law jurisdiction. Healy's characterization of the situation seems more apt than that of Young and Wasunna.
He suggests that:
... the form of criminal prohibitions can include regulatory aspects, but, it would seem, the measures must be
characterized by an underlying criminal purpose. To the extent that the regulatory structure appears only to
put conditions on otherwise lawful conduct, it is improbable that the courts will characterize the matter of the
legislation as being in relation to a criminal purpose. It is not solely a question of the complexity of the
regulatory scheme: it is also whether the dominant purpose of the legislation is to define unlawful conduct or
to define the conditions under which lawful conduct may be pursued.(FN59)
It seems, then, that much will depend on the details of a national governance scheme for RIH as to
whether it can be upheld under the federal criminal law power. However, the recent jurisprudence seems to
lend support to the position that the federal government's jurisdiction over criminal law might support fairly
complex and extensive regulatory schemes provided that they are for the purpose of pursuing a valid
criminal law purpose backed by a prohibition and a penalty.
It is also interesting to note that the federal government's proposal to regulate NRTs contains a significant
regulatory component. The federal government is thus clearly of the view that it has the power to regulate as
part of its criminal law power. For example, in accompanying material on the Health Canada website,
answers are given to "frequently asked questions".(FN60) Among these questions is the following: "Why is
the federal government legislating in this area -- isn't it an area where the provinces have control?" The
answer offered is instructive:
The draft legislation is founded upon the federal responsibility for criminal law, as is other federal health
protection legislation such as the Food and Drugs Act and the Tobacco Act. In Canada, the courts have
affirmed that the criminal law power will support the creation of prohibitions which serve a public purpose,
including public peace, order, security, health and morality. The draft legislation on assisted human
reproduction contains prohibitions pertaining to a number of unacceptable activities including cloning and
commercial surrogacy. The proposal that is now before the Standing Committee on Health is the result of

consultations with the provinces and territories, as well as with numerous stakeholder groups and concerned
members of the public. A consensus exists that the Government of Canada should provide leadership by
putting in place a legislative framework that would ensure consistency of measures governing assisted
human reproduction.(FN61)
Given that this proposed legislation contains a significant and complex regulatory scheme, it is possible
that the federal government might invoke its criminal law power in a similar manner to regulate RIH.
B) TRADE AND COMMERCE
Section 91(2) of the Constitution gives Parliament the authority to regulate matters relating to trade and
commerce. There are two "branches" of the federal trade and commerce power: the regulation of
interprovincial and international trade and commerce, and a "general" trade and commerce power.(FN62)
The first branch of the power allows Parliament to regulate commercial activity where there is movement of
goods or services across provincial or international boundaries. This power may cover the regulation of
transactions that are completely intra-provincial in nature if such regulation is incidental to some extraprovincial trade or commercial policy.(FN63) To the extent RIH involves international and/or interprovincial
commercial activity, this branch of the trade and commerce power may support federal regulation of RIH in
limited areas. As Jackman notes in reference to NRTs:
Parliament can regulate the international and interprovincial commercial aspects of NRTs, including the
interprovincial or international activities of commercial bodies engaged in the research, development, and
application of NRT-related products or services. In particular, the federal government could regulate the
import, export, interprovincial trade, and marketing of gametes, fertility drugs, and other new reproductive
products, equipment, and services. The federal government could also regulate international and
interprovincial commercial information registries.(FN64)
Applied to RIH, this might mean that practices such as the formation of databases of genetic information
for licenced commercial use in other provinces or countries might be the subject of valid federal legislation
under the first branch of the trade and commerce power. This branch might also support the regulation of the
research and development of drugs that are sold interprovincially.(FN65)
The second branch of the trade and commerce power -- referred to as the "general" branch -- relates to
the regulation of trade in general (as opposed to specific industries) that affects the country as a whole. The
Supreme Court, in City National Leasing,(FN66) set out a five-part test to determine whether a law is validly
enacted pursuant to this power. The steps of the test are intended to be approached flexibly and inquire
whether a law,
(i) includes the presence of a "general regulatory scheme";
(ii) is overseen by a regulatory agency;
(iii) is concerned with trade as a whole rather than focused on a particular industry;
(iv) is of such a nature that the provinces jointly or severally would be constitutionally incapable of
enacting; and
(v) relates to a situation where the failure to include one province or locality in the legislative scheme
would jeopardize the successful operation of the scheme in other parts of the country.
The general trade and commerce power thus permits federal regulation of commercial activity even where
there is no interprovincial or international movement. It is difficult to see, however, how federal legislation
could be focussed specifically enough to be useful for the purposes of regulating RIH and still be concerned
with trade as a whole and not with a specific industry. In City National Leasing, the legislation upheld under
the general power was a competition law that applied across the board to all commercial activities and

industries. Other regulations that sought to control the use of labels and standards in the beer industry were
struck down as being directed at a specific industry and therefore infringing on the provincial jurisdiction over
property and civil rights, even though the industry was dominated by three large producers operating on a
national scale.(FN67)
Thus, while Jackman suggests that "[d]epending on the form and scope of the legislation, the federal
government could attempt to support comprehensive NRT legislation under the general branch of the trade
and commerce power," it might be difficult to structure legislation in such a way that it could be said to
concern "trade as a whole." It would be equally challenging for the federal government to gain general
jurisdiction over RIH under the trade and commerce power. However, the general trade and commerce
power might well provide justification for federal legislation regulating the commercial aspects of RIH. For
example, competition laws would apply to any commercial entities conducting RIH.
C) PEACE, ORDER AND GOOD GOVERNMENT (POGG)
The opening sentence of s. 91 gives the federal government the power to:
...make laws for the Peace, Order, and good Government of Canada, in relation to all Matters not coming
within the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces...
This power is often referred to as the POGG power. It is residual in nature, as is clear from the wording of
the provision; the POGG power can only be used to ground jurisdiction over subject matters not coming
within the provincial sphere of power. The POGG power has been interpreted as including three
branches(FN68): "gap", "national concern" and "emergency." Of these, the gap and emergency branches
offer little support for federal legislative action regulating research involving humans. The national concern
branch is the most promising branch of POGG with respect to federal jurisdiction over RIH.
I) GAP
The gap branch, as articulated by Peter Hogg, reflects the residual nature of the POGG power. POGG
reserves for the federal Parliament those matters not expressly included in the enumerated heads of power
of the provinces. If this were the end of the story, as Hogg explains, the gap branch could have potentially
limitless application given the fact that "[i]t is of course always possible to classify a law by labelling its
'matter' or 'pith and substance' with a name which does not appear to come within any of the enumerated
heads of power."(FN69) The gap branch has, however, been restricted in its application to those situations
where it is logically required; that is, where a gap in the division of powers exists and needs to be filled. For
example, in the face of the grant of power to the provinces in s. 92(11) relating to "the incorporation of
companies with provincial objects," and the lack of any corresponding enumerated federal power of
incorporation, the courts found that the power to incorporate companies with objects other than provincial
must be a federal one under the gap branch of POGG.(FN70) There is no similar logical gap with respect to
RIH's that would justify federal legislation in this area under this branch of POGG.
The gap power does apply to cases where the subject matter is new or one not dealt with in the division of
powers. However, the residual nature of POGG does not automatically entail the assignment of novel
subject matters to the federal government. Rather, as Hogg notes:
...[i]n most cases a 'new' or hitherto unrecognized kind of law does not have any necessary or logical claim
to come within p.o.g.g. It might come within property or civil rights in the province (s. 92(13)) or matters of a
merely local or private nature in the province (s.92(16)). Which head of power is appropriate depends on the
nature of the 'new' matter, and the scope which is attributed to the various competing heads of power of
which p.o.g.g. is only one.(FN71)
Thus, while it may be that much of the subject matter at issue in RIH is "new" in the sense that it relates to

technologies and practices that could not have been contemplated at the time of Confederation, this is not
sufficient to ground federal jurisdiction under POGG.
II) EMERGENCY
The emergency branch of the POGG power is also not a promising source for federal jurisdiction over
RIH.(FN72) In order to be justified under the emergency branch of the federal POGG power, legislation
must, as the name of the branch suggests, deal with an emergency. This has generally been interpreted to
include occurances like war, insurrection and economic crisis. The emergency branch might thus serve as a
basis for federal jurisdiction over a health related issue, for example, in the case of an epidemic. However, it
would not likely be able to ground a general federal jurisdiction over health. It is important to note that courts
will not require factual proof that an emergency exists. Rather, all that is required is a rational basis for the
finding that an emergency exists.(FN73) The federal government's power to invoke this branch of POGG
may be further strengthened by the fact that the burden may rest with those challenging the law to show that
no such rational basis exists for finding that there is an emergency.(FN74) It is a fairly difficult task to show
that there is no rational basis for finding an emergency situation. As a result, it appears as if "the federal
Parliament can use its emergency power almost at will."(FN75)
There is, however, one significant limitation upon Parliament's use of the emergency branch of POGG: it
can only justify temporary legislative measures.(FN76) The rationale for the emergency branch of POGG is
that an unusual and extraordinary situation requires a grant of power to the federal government so that it can
deal with a temporary situation. The presumption is that once the emergency is dealt with, the federal
government no longer requires these powers and the regular division of powers should have effect again.
Thus, the emergency branch of POGG cannot serve as a basis for permanent federal jurisdiction over a
subject matter otherwise not within its jurisdiction. Although the Court has indicated that the Government will
receive a great deal of deference on the issue of whether an emergency and the need for the legislation
passed in response to it has ended, the ultimate limitation to temporary measures is a very significant
one.(FN77)
It is clear, then, why the federal government cannot ground a jurisdictional claim over RIH on the
emergency branch of POGG. First, the unregulated state of health research in Canada does not represent
an emergency of the kind for which the emergency POGG power is typically invoked (i.e. war, insurrection,
economic crisis); and, second, the regulation of health research implies an ongoing legislative response to a
permanent situation, and is not amenable to the sort of temporary response allowable under the emergency
branch of POGG.
III) NATIONAL CONCERN
While the gap and emergency branches of the POGG power are insufficient to ground federal regulation
of health research, the national concern branch is a much more promising source of jurisdiction for the
federal government in this area. One of the leading cases on the national concern branch of the POGG
power is R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd.(FN78) In Crown Zellerbach, the majority of the Supreme Court
of Canada outlined "firmly established" guidelines for determining whether a national concern exists such
that the federal Parliament can assert jurisdiction.
First, the Court explained that the national concern doctrine can be used as a basis to grant federal
jurisdiction over new matters. As explained earlier, when faced with a new matter not contemplated at the
time of Confederation, courts must look at the existing heads of power to determine where the new power
ought to be assigned. One possibility is the national concern branch of POGG if the new matter is one of
national scope. The national concern branch can, however, also be used to grant federal jurisdiction over

matters that were originally assigned to the provinces. The Supreme Court recognized the possibility that
matters that were originally ones of a local of private nature in a province might become matters of national
concern. Note that this change does not require the existence of a national emergency and there is no
indication that this change must be temporary. The national concern branch thus has more far reaching
effects than the emergency branch of POGG, as it can effect a permanent reassignment of jurisdiction from
that originally contained in the division of powers.
The Supreme Court set out the following requirements for a matter to be one of national concern:
...it must have a singleness, distinctiveness and indivisibility that clearly distinguishes it from matters of
provincial concern and a scale of impact on provincial jurisdiction that is reconcilable with the fundamental
distribution of legislative power under the Constitution.
...
In determining whether a matter has attained the required degree of singleness, distinctiveness and
indivisibility that clearly distinguishes it from matters of provincial concern it is relevant to consider what
would be the effect on extra-provincial interests of a provincial failure to deal effectively with the control or
regulation of the intra-provincial aspects of the matter.(FN79)
The national concern branch of POGG can thus only grant jurisdiction over areas that are relatively
narrow. This reflects the concern that this branch not be used to trench significantly into the provincial
sphere. A subject matter claimed to be a national concern must be contained and specific so that granting
jurisdiction over it will not result in a wide federal jurisdiction over provincial areas. One way of checking that
the federal power would not trench too seriously on that of the provinces is to look for evidence of what has
been referred to as inter-jurisdictional spillovers -- that is, where the failure of one province to adequately
deal with an issue will have negative consequences outside the province. Essentially the court asks "what
would happen if this were left to the provinces and one of them failed to regulate adequately?" If the effect
would extend beyond the borders of the province, the Court views this as evidence that the matter is one of
national concern -- one that cannot be left to the provinces to regulate independently. Further, the existence
of inter-jurisdictional effects provides a reason for federal involvement in what has traditionally been a
provincial sphere. If the purpose is to prevent harmful effects outside the province, the federal government
cannot be said to be unduly trenching on provincial powers and the issue is clearly one of national concern.
As with the emergency branch of POGG, it is important to assess the evidentiary burden placed on the
government with respect to showing a national concern. Specifically, must the government prove negative
inter-jurisdictional effects in order to establish a matter of national concern? Requiring the federal
government to show these negative effects might pose a significant problem in the context of RIH given that
the issue has only recently received close attention and its long term effects are not yet known, and, further,
the private nature of much of the research means that the harmful effects are seldom tracked or recorded
and made public. Often only anecdotal evidence is available with respect to the effects of RIH. Thus, at best,
arguments about the inter-jurisdictional harmful effects will amount to educated opinions. Is this a sufficient
basis to support a federal claim for jurisdiction under national concern?(FN80)
The doctrine of presumption of constitutionality(FN81) is helpful in this respect. The presumption of
constitutionality places the burden of proof in jurisdictional cases on the party seeking to challenge the law.
In the context of federal regulation of RIH, this means that the individuals or organizations seeking to
challenge jurisdiction must show that the federal government lacks jurisdiction. This presumption has three
significant effects(FN82):
* If the subject matter of a law can be characterized in more than one way, all things being equal the

characterization that is consistent with the constitution (the characterization under which the law would be
valid) should be preferred.(FN83)
* If the validity of a law depends upon a finding of fact, the government should not be held to a strict
standard of proof but rather there need only be a rational basis for the finding.
* If a law is open to both a narrow and broad interpretation and it would be valid under the narrow and not
the broad, the law should be read down in order to save the law.
The presumption of constitutionality is generally helpful to those seeking to make the case for federal
jurisdiction in the area of RIH. Once the federal government enacts legislation on this issue, the burden will
be on those seeking to challenge its jurisdiction to do so. Furthermore, the presumption of constitutionality
would seem to suggest that there need not be concrete evidence of negative inter-jurisdictional effects
resulting from provincial failure to regulate. Instead, all that must be shown is that a rational basis for such a
finding exists. Indeed, given that the onus rests on those challenging federal jurisdiction, as with the
emergency branch, it would seem to be incumbent upon the challengers to show that such a rational basis
does not exist. Thus, the lack of substantial evidence of harm should not present an insurmountable problem
for finding RIH to be a matter of national concern.
The 1993 Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies argued that the national concern
doctrine guidelines discussed above can be applied so as to provide constitutional justification for federal
regulation of the research and application of NRTs.(FN84) Indeed, the national concern branch of the POGG
power was put forward as the primary constitutional justification for the Commission's proposed federal
legislative scheme for regulation of NRTs. The Commission's argument can be summarized as follows:
(i) reproduction as a biological function is clearly distinguishable from other matters of human health, and
has particular social, ethical, political, economic and legal significance not present in other health-related
matters; therefore, NRTs have the required degree of "singleness, distinctiveness and indivisibility" from
other areas of medical science, technology, research and health service(FN85);
(ii) the interests sought to be protected by regulation of NRTs include those of the individuals involved, of
particular societal groups such as women, of Canadian society as a whole (including future generations),
and of those outside Canadian borders; since all of these interests are interconnected, to be effective the
legislative response requires a degree of comprehensiveness only available at the national level(FN86);
(iii) the subject matter of NRTs is beyond the ability of individual provinces to regulate; since
interprovincial variations in standards, coupled with the mobility of Canadian citizens, means that the
detrimental effects of certain NRT practices occurring in one province are likely to be felt in other provinces,
and there will be an increased incidence of "forum shopping" or "reproductive tourism"(FN87); and
(iv) the national nature of the problem is illustrated by the fact that other countries have established
nationally-based regulatory schemes regarding NRTs, including Britain, Australia, France and Denmark.
(FN88)
These arguments are supported by Jackman in her legal research report prepared for the Commission.
(FN89) According to Jackman, the "national concern" nature of NRTs is represented by the very fact that
there was sufficient concern on the part of the national public and their legislators to establish the Royal
Commission. Furthermore, she argues:
National concern over the development and use of NRTs and their recent origins are significant factors for
the purposes of constitutional classification. Like most subjects assigned by the courts to the federal POGG
power, NRTs did not exist as a conceptually distinct matter at the time of Confederation. Clearly, they are of
national rather than 'merely local or private' concern. In particular, they extend beyond the scope of local or

provincial health as it is understood under s. 92(13) and are more properly characterised as 'national
welfare'(FN90)
Jackman recognizes that, "on one level", the subject matter of NRTs embraces a wide variety of
component subjects, including public education, occupational and environmental safety, reproductive health
and medical technology. Thus, it may be argued that the subject of NRTs lacks the "singleness,
distinctiveness and indivisibility" required under the national concern branch of the POGG power, and that
the component subjects should be identified and assigned to the provincial legislature for regulation on a
province-by-province basis.(FN91) However, like the Commission, Jackman argues that the "human
reproductive health" aspect of NRTs gives them a conceptual and practical distinctness from other health
matters, such that any federal legislative response would be limited and would not be overly intrusive upon
provincial jurisdiction. Citing various Supreme Court cases dealing with the national concern branch of the
POGG power, Jackman argues:
NRTs as a legislative matter are not 'totally lacking in specificity' or 'so pervasive that it knows no bounds.'
Unlike 'containment and reduction of inflation,' which Justice Beetz characterized as a subject too diffuse for
federal jurisdiction under the POGG power in the Anti-Inflation Act Reference, NRTs possess practical,
conceptual integrity and cohesiveness. Federal intervention in this area would be delimited in object and
scope. Attributing jurisdiction over NRTs to the federal government under the POGG clause would not
'radically alter the division of legislative powers in Canada' or 'render most provincial powers nugatory.' As in
other areas, valid general provincial legislation, for example relating to hospitals and local health, could have
an incidental impact on NRTs as a federal matter.(FN92)
Based on these arguments, Jackman posits that the federal POGG power provides a basis for the
following matters becoming the subject of federal legislative intervention(FN93):
(i) prevention of infertility, including the development of contraceptives and the prevention and treatment
of STDs and other causes of infertility;
(ii) research, data collection, medical practices, and public education;
(iii) all aspects of assisted human reproduction, including IVF, embryo transfer, artificial insemination,
surrogate motherhood and adoption;
(iv) establishing public review mechanisms and impact-assessment processes;
(v) licensing participants and facilities;
(vi) creating a public-property regime in NRT research; and
(vii) determining the legal status of the embryo and fetus for the purposes of federal law.
Many of the arguments made by Jackman and the Royal Commission regarding NRTs also appear to be
relevant to the issue of health and RIH. Clearly, many of the types of RIH that would potentially be subject to
regulation could not have been contemplated at the time of Confederation (e.g. NRTs, stem cell transfer,
human genomics, cloning, etc.). Even though health research in and of itself is not an inherently new topic,
its present practice as compared to that at the time of Confederation would appear to be so radically
different as to be considered distinct. Furthermore, given the fact that a great deal of modern health research
involves integrated networks of health care facilities, educational institutions, medical professionals and
pharmaceutical companies that cross both provincial and international lines, a convincing argument could be
made that the regulation of RIH can no longer be accurately described as dealing only with matters of a
merely local and private nature, and has instead become a matter of national concern. The arguments of
Jackman and the Commission regarding the problem of forum shopping would also seem to be germane to
the issue of RIH, and would point to the inability of individual provinces to effectively regulate the subject

matter on their own.
As mentioned above, establishing federal constitutional authority for the regulation of RIH under the
POGG power requires more than simply that the subject be found to be of national concern. It must also be
shown that the matter is one of such "singleness, distinctiveness and indivisibility" that it can be adequately
delineated so as to prevent over-broad and/or indeterminate intrusion into the provincial sphere of
jurisdiction. In some ways, the subject of RIH is both more and less encompassing than NRTs. On the one
hand, whereas the topic of NRTs would include many different component subject matters, ranging from
research to treatment to public education, and the control of adoption and surrogate motherhood (see the list
above), RIH by definition involves only the research aspects of health. In that sense, RIH is a more "selfcontained" subject matter than NRTs and thereby more amenable to regulation under the federal POGG
power. On the other hand, one of the main factors cited by Jackman and the Commission as evidence of the
fact that NRTs as a subject had the requisite "singleness, distinctiveness and indivisibility" was the fact that
only matters of reproductive health were involved, to which specific legal, moral, political, economic and
social considerations were attached that were not relevant with regards to other health and medical-related
subjects. The argument they advance is that NRT can be carved out as a specific and isolated health issue.
It should be noted that the conclusions of Jackman and the Royal Commission as to the scope under the
POGG power for the federal government to regulate NRTs has been the subject of extensive criticism. For
example, Patrick Healy disputes whether such constitutional authority actually exists.(FN94) Citing the
Crown Zellerbach case and Hogg, Healy notes that the Supreme Court has shown "considerable reluctance"
to grant federal power over subject matter that is nominally part of the provincial sphere of power.(FN95)
Responding to the arguments of Jackman and the Royal Commission that the subject matter of NRTs
possesses the required degree of "singleness, distinctiveness and indivisibility," Healy maintains that:
The argument that the many issues associated with human reproduction are interrelated is simply a
description of a political and scientific reality. That description does not lead to a conclusion in law that '[n]ew
reproductive technologies possess a conceptual and practical integrity and distinctiveness.' It certainly does
not allow the assertion that 'reproduction is easily distinguishable from other matters of human health.'
Indeed, the observation that reproductive technologies are so tightly related with many areas of provincial
concern is fully consistent with a conclusion that they have not emerged as a national concern in the strict
sense required by the courts. There is no apparent evidence that the provinces have failed to act in relation
to the matter or that they are unable to do so. Nor is there evidence to support a conclusion that material
harm will result if the provinces fail to take uniform measures with respect to matters within their authority.
There is no apparent vacuum in Canadian public policy on reproductive technologies that only the national
governments can fill. Indeed, if it were arguable that reproductive technologies have become a matter of
national concern warranting a breach of Canadian federalism in favour of uniform action by the national
government it would lead easily to the surprising proposition that any matter of national concern is
inconsistent with the basic tenets of federalism. Canadian courts have resisted arguments of this kind, and it
is difficult to envisage a successful legal and factual basis on which to argue that reproductive technologies
present a matter of 'great and manifest necessity' that cannot be addressed adequately by continued
respect for the distribution of legislative competence. In short, the desire for a coherent national policy on
reproductive technologies is not a case in law for allowing Parliament to assume sweeping legislative
responsibility.(FN96)
Healy's doubts about whether the federal POGG power provides sufficient constitutional justification for
regulation of NRTs seem to be shared by a number of other commentators.(FN97) In their discussion of Bill

C-47, a 1996 initiative on the part of the federal government to regulate certain NRTs and genetic
procedures, Young and Wasunna note that there is "little jurisprudential support" for the Royal Commission's
position that NRTs represent a "national concern", and that "in fact, there is substantial authority holding that
the POGG power is to be restrictively interpreted."(FN98) In addition:
The POGG power has, in recent years, fallen into a certain amount of disuse and ... it was not at all as
obvious as the Royal Commission seemed to believe, that in the event of a challenge, the Supreme Court of
Canada would be inclined to invoke the POGG power to support this initiative. In the result, it appears that
the federal government has wisely abandoned the POGG power as a peg for federal legislative jurisdiction
in favour of the criminal law power.(FN99)
Clearly, RIH in and of itself encompasses all forms of health research, from drug testing to experimental
surgery to stem cell research. It even has the potential to include the testing of consumer products such as
cosmetics and genetically modified food. This might lead one to conclude that RIH represents a much more
indeterminate intrusion into provincial jurisdiction, and would therefore seem less appropriate for federal
regulation under the POGG power. However, this conclusion is not inevitable. It is, as the academic criticism
indicates, a debatable proposition that NRT represents a single isolated health matter that is distinct enough
to qualify as a national concern. Even if it does, it is not necessary for all matters coming within the national
concern aspect of the POGG power to exhibit singleness, distinctiveness and indivisibility in the same way.
RIH does indeed have a broad range of application in spheres within and outside federal jurisdiction.
However, RIH is one very specific aspect of research that can be isolated and regulated without dictating or
taking over other aspects of research controlled by the provinces or without a general federal assertion of
control over the contexts in which such research takes place. For example, federal regulation of RIH would
affect research conducted in hospitals which are clearly within provincial jurisdiction but it would not take
control of hospitals out of provincial hands, nor would it dictate other aspects of research that are subject to
provincial authority. In fact, regulation of RIH appears to exemplify the rationale at the heart of the national
concern branch of POGG. Whether one thinks such research is a new issue not considered at
Confederation or one thought to be a concern of a local and private nature at the time, it is an issue that
through its development and proliferation has become a national concern. Further, given the extent to which
the issue affects only a specific element of research, the case for its distinctiveness and singleness seems
to rest on much firmer ground than simply a perceived need for regulation.
IV) TREATY POWER
There is one other way in which federal RIH legislation might be defended under the POGG power. It has
been suggested by some commentators, and has been the subject of some comment from the Supreme
Court of Canada, that the federal government might claim a power over treaty implementation under POGG.
However, as the following discussion makes clear, there is no enumerated federal treaty implementation
power, nor has this power found root in POGG.
As noted by Kathleen Glass, the issue of ethical standards in RIH has been the subject of international
attention since the end of World War II and the Nuremberg trials.(FN100) Since that time, numerous
international bodies of which Canada is a member, including the World Health Organization, have issued
ethical guidelines for the conduct of RIH.(FN101) The federal government under POGG clearly has the
constitutional authority to enter into international treaties and agreements that are binding on Canada as a
whole under international law.(FN102) However, this authority has not yet been extended to confer on
Parliament the ability to enact legislation required to implement its various international commitments where
the subject matter of those commitments would normally fall under provincial jurisdiction. In the 1937 Labour

Conventions case(FN103), the Privy Council struck down certain federal provisions that sought to implement
labour standards that Canada had committed to as a member of the International Labour Organization. The
Court held that the power to implement treaties domestically was divided between the federal and provincial
governments by subject matter, as per the division of powers contained in ss. 91 and 92.(FN104) Thus, the
federal government has no constitutional authority flowing from its treaty making power to legislate in areas
that are normally within provincial jurisdiction. On this interpretation, the treaty making power would not
appear to confer any independent authority on Parliament to regulate those aspects of RIH that would
normally fall within provincial jurisdiction.
There is, however, some evidence to suggest that the precedent set by the Labour Conventions case may
be open to revision by the Supreme Court of Canada. For example, in MacDonald v. Vapor Canada
Ltd.(FN105), both the majority decision by Laskin C.J. and de Grandpré J.'s concurring decision suggest that
the Court might be willing to reconsider the issue of an independent head of power for the federal
government to implement treaties, although neither found it necessary to decide the issue in that
case.(FN106) The potential that the position in the Labour Conventions case might be revised is also
considered by Hogg(FN107) and Jackman.(FN108) Jackman, for example, suggests that the federal treaty
power could be used to provide "ancillary support" for federal legislation implementing Canada's treaty
obligations regarding NRTs (and, as argued earlier, this claim might be extended to include RIH), particularly
where these obligations are aimed at protecting human rights.(FN109)
Until such time as the Court has an opportunity to revisit this issue, however, the Labour Convention
precedent stands and the federal government cannot ground its jurisdiction over RIH on a power over treaty
interpretation.(FN110)
D) OTHER FEDERAL POWERS
While the heads of power discussed above represent the most likely constitutional justifications for broad
federal regulation of RIH, several other possibilities exist for more limited federal jurisdiction. For example,
sections 91(7) (the military), 91(11) (quarantines and marine hospitals), 91(22) (patents), 91(24) (Indians and
lands reserved for Indians) and 91(28) (penitentiaries) might all support federal RIH regulation in very limited
and context-specific settings. In addition, the federal taxing power might provide a means for the federal
government to encourage or discourage certain RIH practices conducted by private researchers and private
industry (e.g. through the use of tax incentives).(FN111) However, as these are all so limited in their potential
scope, they will not be considered further here.
5. JOINT FEDERAL AND PROVINCIAL JURISDICTION -- DIVIDED OR OVERLAPPING JURISDICTION
OVER RIH
The preceding sections have considered the case for exclusive provincial or federal jurisdiction over RIH.
At the outset of the paper, we outlined four basic possibilities with respect to jurisdiction over RIH.
Jurisdiction can either rest exclusively with the federal or provincial governments, or it can be divided or
overlapping. Based on the foregoing discussion, the strongest case for exclusive jurisdiction rests with the
federal government under either the criminal law power or the POGG (national concern) power. Both of
these heads of power provide a promising base from which the federal government might derive authority to
institute a national governance system for RIH. Should such arguments fail, however, and the federal
powers not be found comprehensive enough to include RIH in its totality, the federal government could still
pursue a national governance system for RIH. In the absence of clear and exclusive jurisdiction over RIH, it
seems clear that there would be joint jurisdiction and this would be either split or shared between the
provincial and federal levels of government.

A. DIVIDED JURISDICTION
Perhaps the most obvious scenario for joint jurisdiction is that each level of government would have
authority over RIH when it occurred in a context within its jurisdiction. Thus, the provinces would have the
power to regulate RIH when it is undertaken in hospitals and universities, whereas the federal government
would have jurisdiction when it occurs in prisons or affects interprovincial or international trade and
commerce. The division is, however, unlikely to be this neat. Divided jurisdiction in the case of RIH may
prove difficult and complex given the integrated nature of the RIH issue. It is not easy to divide the topic
along jurisdictional lines. For example, drug trials involving RIH are often carried out in universities or
hospitals and yet are ultimately and intimately connected to the marketing and sale of drugs across
provincial boundaries.
In addition, the division is likely to be unequal considering the fact that the federal government's power
under criminal law to prohibit RIH practices in the interest of safety, health and morality could have a fairly
significant, although incidental, effect on provincial regulation. It seems likely then, that the federal
government, even in a divided jurisdiction scenario would have a greater scope of control over RIH. Finally,
even in the face of a determination that jurisdiction over RIH is divided between the federal and provincial
levels of government, the federal government will have at its disposal some significant constitutional
mechanisms to encourage provincial cooperation and implement a national governance scheme for RIH.
Before considering these mechanisms, however, it is important to explore the other option for joint federal
provincial jurisdiction over RIH--overlapping jurisdiction.
B. OVERLAPPING JURISDICTION
Shared jurisdiction in terms of overlapping jurisdiction is different from the divided shared jurisdiction
scenario considered in the previous section. In the case of divided jurisdiction, each government has
authority to legislate with respect to a topic when it is otherwise within its jurisdiction -- thereby dividing the
topic along the lines of the constitutional division of power. Where jurisdiction is overlapping, each sphere of
government can legislate with respect to the whole of a topic, each gaining such authority because the topic
can be characterized as a subject matter over which the legislator has exclusive jurisdiction. Overlapping
jurisdiction is thus different than divided jurisdiction in that the topic, in this case RIH, can be dealt with as a
whole by both the federal government and the provinces. Jurisdiction can only be shared in the sense of
overlapping, however, if the topic at issue can be said to have a double aspect such that it can be
characterized as concerning more than one subject matter falling in one respect within the provincial
jurisdiction and in another within the federal authority. This scenario would require the application of the
double aspect doctrine discussed earlier in the paper. Recall, this doctrine allows both levels of governments
to pass legislation on a subject matter owing to the fact that different aspects of the subject matter are within
the jurisdiction of each order of government. For example, in the Schneider case, the Supreme Court of
Canada upheld provincial legislation providing for compulsory treatment of heroin addicts, despite the fact
that federal criminal law also provided compulsory consequences for the use of heroin (i.e. criminal
sanctions). Despite the valid federal legislation already existing on the subject matter, the Court upheld the
provincial legislation since it sought to regulate an aspect of heroin addiction and use (i.e. the medical
treatment aspect) that was within the overall provincial jurisdiction over health described above.(FN112)
To use a well-worn constitutional analogy then, in overlapping jurisdiction both the federal government
and the provinces can occupy the field of RIH whereas if jurisdiction is divided, each level of government will
be confined to its own section of the field. With respect to RIH, one might make the case that jurisdiction is
overlapping owing to the broad scope of the provincial powers over health and the federal authority under

criminal law and POGG over RIH.
However, it is important to note that even if jurisdiction is found to be overlapping with regard to RIH, the
federal government is in a stronger position vis a vis the provinces to govern RIH owing to the doctrine of
paramountcy. In situations where jurisdiction is overlapping and the federal and provincial laws conflict, that
is where the concurrent provincial legislation would interfere with or frustrate the federal legislation, the
doctrine of "paramountcy" dictates that the federal law would trump and the provincial law would be found
inoperative to the extent of the conflict.(FN113) This federal advantage is, however, limited by the fact that
"conflict" has generally been defined strictly so as to refer to situations where the two laws are "operationally
incompatible" or where "compliance with one law necessarily requires breach of the other."(FN114) The
mere fact that Parliament has "occupied the field" by legislating in an area is unlikely to exclude otherwise
valid provincial jurisdiction.(FN115) However, if the provincial law can be shown to frustrate the purpose of
the federal legislation then a conflict will be found and the federal legislation will prevail.(FN116)
The continued possibility of provincial regulation in the area of RIH (provided it does not conflict with
federal legislation on the issue) might prompt the federal government to use other means to secure
provincial cooperation. Such cooperation will also be important to the success of a national governance
system for RIH as mentioned in the previous section in that case of divided jurisdiction over RIH.
Furthermore, even if RIH were found to be a single and complete subject matter within the federal POGG
power, valid provincial legislation that incidentally affected RIH would still be a possibility. In fact, given the
broad provincial jurisdiction over health-related matters it would seem highly likely that many provincial
statutes will have an incidental application to the subject of RIH (for example, provincial regulation of
hospitals). Thus, via the double aspect and/or "incidental effects" doctrines, the possibility of concurrent
federal and provincial jurisdiction in the area of RIH appears high. It is therefore important for the federal
government in its bid to implement a national governance system for RIH to contemplate the mechanisms at
its disposal to encourage and obtain provincial cooperation in such a scheme.
C. FEDERAL AND PROVINCIAL COOPERATION IN THE GOVERNANCE OF RIH
Perhaps the most significant constitutional mechanism at the federal government's disposal to encourage
provincial cooperation and achieve a central regulatory scheme for RIH is the federal spending power. The
federal spending power is not expressly provided for in the Constitution but is implied from the federal power
over public property and the public debt under s. 91 (1A), the federal taxing power under s. 91(3), and the
federal appropriations power under s. 106.(FN117) This power enables the use of conditional grants of
federal money through which the federal government is able to exert influence over matters normally within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the provinces. The most familiar use of this power is federal regulation of
national standards for the provision of health care services via the Canada Health Act.(FN118) Acceptance
of these standards by the provinces is a prerequisite for the receipt of federal transfer payments. Regardless
of the policy arguments for and against such federal intervention, there appears to be little doubt that the
federal government's use of its spending power in this way is constitutionally valid as confirmed by the
Supreme Court of Canada in Re Canada Assistance Plan.(FN119)
It is thus open to the federal government to encourage/compel acceptance of and compliance with
national guidelines relating to RIH through the use of its spending power. To a certain degree, RIH is
currently regulated this way, since to be eligible for federal government funding, research must first be
reviewed by research ethics boards (REBs), according to the policy statement established by the three
national funding councils.(FN120) Furthermore, all institutions receiving council funding must certify
compliance with this policy statement. This arrangement leaves all research not conducted at institutions

receiving national council funding (or by researchers employed by such institutions) unregulated by the
policy statement. The federal government could of course try to compel provinces to require all research
within their borders to meet a set of national standards by making this a requirement for the receipt of
federal transfer payments for the provision of health or education services. Jackman suggests that
Parliament could similarly control NRTs by authorizing federal spending under conditions set in new NRT
legislation or under existing legislation such as the Canada Health Act.(FN121) Of course, the effectiveness
of such regulation is entirely dependent on the amount of money the federal government is willing to put on
the table and the provincial need for funding. One of the weaknesses of this as a means of regulating RIH is
that it is uncertain and can be without teeth. Should a province decide not to apply or enforce regulations,
the only consequence is the withdrawal of funding. Thus, a province is not bound by its agreement, and
could at any time decide to breech it and forego the funding. Furthermore, given the political nature of the
arrangement, provinces might have considerable latitude in their level of cooperation and compliance before
the federal government would take action.
Another option akin to the use of the spending power that would address this certainty concern is the use
of contract. The federal power to contract is similar in scope to its power over spending. The federal
government could thus contract with the provinces over the issue of the regulation of RIH, trading provincial
compliance with federal regulation for government funds. The primary advantage of contracting versus using
the spending power is that contracts are binding and enforceable by the courts. Thus, the agreement is likely
to offer greater certainty. However, this is also one of its major drawbacks as a strategy for gaining provincial
cooperation -- namely, provinces must agree to contract and thus give over aspects of their jurisdiction in a
more permanent way.
One of the concerns that might be raised with respect to shared jurisdiction and prompt the
implementation of a cooperative approach is the complexity and expense involved in setting up multiple
administrative schemes in the various provinces to deal with RIH regulation. Inter-delegation of provincial
power over RIH matters might offer some alternative to the problems and costs inherent in the creation of
multiple administrative bodies charged with the enforcement of RIH regulation. Inter-delegation, in the sense
of provinces assigning legislative powers to the federal government, is not permitted under the Constitution.
The Supreme Court of Canada has held that this would be tantamount to allowing provinces to alter the
division of powers and such authority is not granted by the Constitution.(FN122) However, while legislative
inter-delegation is not an option, administrative interdelegation has been found constitutional.(FN123) Under
this option, provincial governments could assign their regulatory power to a federal administrative body
essentially enabling the federal administrative body to discharge provincial authority according to the rules
and regulations set out by the federal government.
Another option for coordination between the provincial and federal governments is incorporation by
reference whereby the provincial legislation of RIH could adopt the federal regulations or a federal
administrative board as its own. Finally, even if the federal government is able to establish exclusive
authority over RIH they might still allow for provincial diversity of implementation through the use of an opt
out clause. Such a clause would allow the provinces to opt out of the scheme provided that they have similar
legislation. This approach has been utilized recently in the federal privacy legislation.(FN124)
6. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, there seems to be no basis upon which to conclude that regulation of RIH would fall
exclusively within provincial jurisdiction. Provincial jurisdiction over health is general but not exclusive and
for the most part is focused on public health issues. Furthermore, the jurisprudence has made clear that

there are exceptions to this general jurisdiction over health and thus room for the federal government to
enter the field.
The case for exclusive federal jurisdiction appears stronger than the provincial case although it is far from
certain. The federal government could make its claim for such jurisdiction under the national concern branch
of the federal POGG power. While there has been some skepticism concerning the ability of this branch of
POGG to sustain federal legislation in the area of assisted human reproductive technologies, the subject
matter of research in humans may be sufficiently more defined and distinctive as to stand a better chance of
meeting the requirements to constitute a national concern. If the federal government is able to gain
jurisdiction on this basis it would have exclusive control over the regulation of RIH.
The other head of power that could be utilized to justify exclusive federal governance of RIH is the
criminal law power. Recent jurisprudence suggests that this power could support a broad regulatory scheme
provided it was undertaken for a valid criminal law purpose and included prohibitions backed by penalties.
Given that the government's primary concern with RIH relates to health, safety and morality, it is likely that
such legislation would be found to have a valid criminal law purpose. What will be determinative is the form
the legislation takes. In order to be justifiable under the criminal law power, such legislation must ultimately
be concerned with prohibition and penalty. This does not, however, preclude exceptions from prohibitions
provided certain conditions are met, thus allowing for significant regulation within the ambit of the criminal
law jurisdiction. This power could therefore support exclusive federal jurisdiction over RIH as any law that
was in conflict with these provisions would be inoperative.
Even in the event that attempts to ground an exclusive or broad jurisdictional claim over RIH are
unsuccessful, the federal government enjoys significant jurisdiction in this area. Absent the power to
regulate, the criminal law power would nevertheless allow the federal government to significantly restrict RIH
practices through outright prohibition. The federal government could also use its trade and commerce power
to exercise jurisdiction over RIH practices as they are connected with or involve inter-provincial or
international trade and commerce. Furthermore, the federal government would have jurisdiction over RIH in
contexts under their authority, such as in prisons and military hospitals. Thus, even in a divided jurisdiction
scenario, federal authority would be significant.
Furthermore, if jurisdiction over RIH is divided or overlapping, the federal government has at its disposal
important constitutional mechanism that might strengthen its bid to govern in this area. First and foremost,
the federal government might use its spending power to encourage provincial cooperation with its regulatory
scheme (either through independent provincial action in line with federal guidelines or through more direct
forms of cooperation including administrative inter-delegation or referential incorporation). In the alternative,
the federal government might seek a more concrete agreement on the issue through the use of contractual
agreements with the provinces.
In designing a national governance scheme for RIH, then, it seems that the federal government ought to
pay close attention to both the form and the purposes of such legislation in order to succeed in defending its
jurisdictional claim. In conclusion, it is interesting to note that much may depend on the nature of the
challenge to federal legislation. Significantly, courts might be more compelled by a jurisdictional challenge if
there is a genuine dispute between the provinces and the federal government than if the jurisdictional
challenge comes from a third party. It is clear, then, that the easiest route to federal jurisdiction over RIH is to
practice co-operative federalism and secure the support of the provinces. Absent such support, however,
there exists a claim worth pursuing for substantial and perhaps exclusive federal jurisdiction in the area of
RIH.
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FOOTNOTES
...not so as to restrict the Generality of the foregoing Terms of this Section, it is hereby declared that
(notwithstanding anything in this Act) the exclusive Legislative Authority of the Parliament of Canada
extends to all Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter enumerated...
Section 92 begins with a similar provision. It reads:
In each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in relation to Matters coming within the
Classes of Subject next hereinafter enumerated....
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